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Lieutenant-Colonel George Trist 
Officer Commanding, 1st Battalion Winnipeg Grenadiers 
North Point Camp, Hong Kong, 30 April 1941 
Brigades and were entirely separate throughout 
the campaign it will be necessary for Lieut Col 
Home who commanded the Royal Rifles of 
Canada and myself to submit separate reports 
in order to have a complete picture of the 
operations as far as the Island is concerned and 
I would also point out the fact that during the 
whole of the operations the late Lieut Col 
Sutcliffe was in command of this Battalion at 
the battle box while I was detailed to take care 
of the administration, reports, returns etc at the 
Battalion Headquarters except for one phase of 
the battle when I was sent up to Mount Cameron 
in command of two composite Companies 
allotted for the defence of that position. And I 
must rely therefore on the reports of the Adjutant 
who was with Col Sutcliffe during the whole of 
the period, and the var ious company 
commanders to cover the various points of which 
I have no personal knowledge. 
At the outbreak of the war 'C Force was 
assigned to the protection of the south coast of 
the Island of Hong Kong and with the exception 
of a small support role during the withdrawal. 
Unde r t aken by 'D' Company Winnipeg 
Grenadiers, they took no part in the battle for 
the mainland and the withdrawal to the Island, 
And any reference to the operations there is 
made on information obtained from senior 
Officers of the units taking part and is submitted 
as such.... 
Immediately on arrival at Hong Kong we 
were handed the defence scheme and a guide 
was allotted to us, on the following day we 
The writer commences this report knowing full well that a report containing criticisms 
or accusations is bound to be read with a certain 
amount of skepticism particularly if it is written 
in opposition to an official report submitted by 
a much higher authority. 
Two important factors have decided me to 
compile this report without further delay and 
while still a prisoner of war and subject to search 
at any time by the Japanese authorities (although 
they have not done so as yet). The first and most 
urgent one is the necessity for a very accurate 
recording of events as they occurred, this would 
not have been so important but for the fact that 
it has become very evident that we (The Canadian 
Forces) are being blamed by the Imperial troops 
for the early fall of Hong Kong. And while it is 
not definitely known that the Imperial staff are 
going to adapt this attitude in their official report 
every precaution must be taken to ensure that 
any attempt to make 'C Force (Canadians) the 
scape goat is adequately challenged by a 
submission of the facts while they are still fresh 
in the memory. The second is that the G.S.0.1. 
Col Nunam informed the late Lieut Col Sutcliffe 
before we left Sham-Shui-Po camp that he had 
already commenced compilation of the official 
report. 
Owing to the very early death of Brigadier 
Lawson and the loss of any record or report he 
may have written, Coupled with the fact that the 
two Canadian Battalions operated in different 
Editor's Note: This is an abridged version of this report. 
The full report can be ordered from our website for a nominal 
charge: <www.canadianmilitaryhistory.com> 
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commenced an extensive reconnaissance of the 
defence positions. One point which struck us 
very forcibly from the outset was the amount of 
last minute preparations such as the drawing of 
extensive mobilization stores and completion of 
vital field works, wiring, mine laying, and road 
blocks, and ammunition and equipment to be 
drawn and distributed. Very little of which was 
allowed to be done until complete mobilization 
was ordered one day before the outbreak of war 
with Japan. 
The front covered by The Winnipeg 
Grenadiers extended from the East end of 
Repulse Bay to the foot of Mount Davis on the 
N.W. end of the Is land, a frontage of 
approximately 13000 yds not including 
Aberdeen Island which was also held by our 
troops. 
The defence scheme was based on five lines 
of defence. (1) The Navy and off shore lines of 
defence in the way of mine fields. (2) The Coast 
defence guns. (3) The Beach defence, Consisting 
of pill boxes covering all possible landing points, 
22 
A mother runs along the tracks to say goodbye to her son 
as he leaves with the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 5 June 1940. 
And a few scattered beach defence guns, Anti 
personal mines, And Barbed wire on the 
beaches. (4) Infantry strong points situated in 
the hills above the coast line to stop penetration 
and to localize any landing. (5) A reserve force 
to counter attack and isolate or destroy any 
enemy landing parties. Though as regards the 
latter force it remained a paper force to the 
end.... 
The whole defence scheme was designed to 
meet a major attack for the sea. The possibility 
of an attack coming from the Japanese occupied 
territory to the North of Kowloon on the 
mainland was not apparently given any serious 
consideration until just prior to the outbreak of 
war as evidenced by the fact that wiring and field 
works on the mainland had not nearly been 
completed when hostilities broke out. This was 
no doubt due to gross under-estimation of the 
Japanese forces in the area. General Maltby told 
us in a lecture shortly after our arrival that the 
Japanese had only about 5000 troops with very 
little Artillery support opposing us from the 
North. And further that their troops were ill 
equipped and not used to night fighting. He also 
said that their aircraft was for the most part 
obsolete and their pilots very mediocre, Unable 
to do dive bombing owing to poor eyesight. All 
of which proved to be incorrect. The unfortunate 
part was that apparently the staff believed it and 
directed their preparations accordingly although 
it should not have been very difficult to obtain 
correct information had their intelligence staff 
been functioning as it should have been. 
There can have been no doubt that if the 
mainland force failed to deny Devils Peak to the 
enemy a successful landing on the N.E. Coast of 
the Island was not only possible but very 
probable. And if the enemy were prepared to 
sacrifice sufficient troops it became a certainty. 
The defence force of the Colony consisted of 
two Imperial Battalions (1 Infantry, 1 Machine 
Gun) both at Garrison strength, Two Indian Rifle 
Battalions also at Garrison strength, and two 
Canadian Battalions. In addition to these there 
was the Hong Kong Volunteer Corps , 
(approximately 1500 all ranks) made up of seven 
companies of Infantry, and Artillery....The Naval 
units consisted of three small Destroyers (Two 
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Above: Personnel of the Winnipeg Grenadiers entraining 
en route to Hong Kong, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 25 October 
1941. 
Right: Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. Sutcliffe, (centre) 
Commanding Officer of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, greets 
one of his junior officers prior to the battalion's departure 
from Winnipeg, 25 October 1941. It is believed the officer 
on the left is Major George Trist. 
of which left for Singapore at the outbreak of 
war). Three river gun boats and sundry small 
craft such as mine laying tugs, And six M.T.Bs. 
Finally there was the air force consisting of three 
old biplanes and two old seaplanes all of which 
were destroyed on the ground the first morning 
of the war. 
The es t imates of the J a p a n e s e Army 
opposing us vary from Two to Five divisions. A 
Japanese Officer told the late Lieut Col Sutcliffe 
and myself that they employed two divisions on 
the Island and had three more in reserve on the 
mainland. And that two hundred guns were 
operating against the Island. 
Owing to the fact that all papers of a military 
nature or of value were ordered destroyed before 
surrender I have to rely on my own and the 
memory of those associated with me during the 
fighting for actual dates and details. 
The defence of Hong Kong was divided into 
two phases. The battle for the mainland, and 
the actual defence of the Island. The mainland 
territory consisted of a strip of very mountainous 
country stretching twenty five miles north of 
Kowloon known as the New Territories and 
ending in a mountainous promptory known as 
Devils Peak across the harbour 400 yds to the 
N.E. of the Island. The defence plan was to hold 
a line known as Gin drinkers line which crossed 
the peninsula as it narrowed down about five 
miles north of the city of Kowloon. This was 
considered a very strong line being fortified by 
frequent pill boxes on an extremely mountainous 
terrain. Two roads and a railroad lead from 
Kowloon to the north border of the territories 
One road running up the East side. The other 
along the sea shore and curving N.E. from the 
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inaccessible except in dead calm weather and 
even then only be expert mountain troops. The 
road problem on the Island is very bad. One 
highway running around the Island close to the 
shore most of the way. There is only one 
additional highway running north and south 
from happy valley (Victoria) on the north shore 
through Wan-Nei-Chong Gap down to Deep Water 
Bay on the south coast cutting the Island in half. 
All other roads outside Victoria are little better 
than very narrow trails and are in most cases 
impassable to motor traffic. 
Another important feature of both the Island 
and the mainland were the water catchments 
which consisted of deep culverts six to ten feet 
deep running round the mountain sides at high 
levels to catch the torrential rainfall, and 
gradually sloping down to the reservoirs. This 
was the water system and incidentally provided 
the Japanese easy covered approaches to all the 
high points on bo th the Island and the mainland. 
A further very important tactical feature was 
the large mountainous area the N.E. of the Island 
about two miles in from the coast line offering 
cover for thousands of troops which was both 
unpopulated and with the exception of small 
bodies of troops on the coastal outskirts not held 
at all. It was through this area that the main 
attack on the capturing the west Brigade 
headquarters. Three companies were allotted to 
cover out extensive frontage with one company 
in reserve at Brigade Headquarters, Wit the 
prime task of assisting the civil powers in 
Victoria. Its secondary task was the defence of 
coast to join the other at Fan-Ling. All of which 
were heavily mined and prepared for demolition. 
But which through some error or oversight were 
not destroyed at the time of the evacuation). It 
was expected that this line would hold for at least 
two weeks thus giving time for the complete 
military evacuation of Kowloon, After which if 
driven in the line would be re-established across 
Devils Peak and held. Thus denying access to 
the narrow channel separating the Island from 
the mainland, also to the high mountain range 
which overlooks a great deal of the Island 
providing wonderful artillery observation and 
very good gun positions at the closest possible 
range.... 
The Island is about ten miles long and seven miles wide and is very mountainous. The 
city of Victoria lies on a very narrow strip of 
waterfront not more than a mile wide along the 
north shore with the main ridge of mountains 
rising immediately behind to a height of 2000 ft 
at the peak. These are broken at intervals by a 
series of gaps, 8 in number giving access to the 
sough part of the Island. From this ridge the 
terrain slopes sharply down to the south shore 
with sundry smaller mountains spotting the 
southern coast. The ground in between is a series 
of north and south saw-back ridges. There are 
four small Islands close to the south coast the 
main one being Aberdeen which consists of one 
high mountain. The coast line all round the East, 
South, and West coast is very hilly and rugged 
and with the exception of a few small beaches 
24 
Officers of "C" Force aboard SS Awatea en 
route to Hong Kong, October 1941. 
I. to r.: Major C.A. Lyndon, Brigade Major; 
Brigadier J.K. Lawson, Brigade Commander; 
Colonel P. Hennessey, Senior Administrative 
Officer; Captain H.S.A. Bush, Staff Captain. 
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On the evening of Dec 6, 1941, a general 
mobil izat ion was ordered by the China 
Command and all units ordered to man their 
battle positions. The following day Dec 7/41 
at about 1000 hrs The Winnipeg Grenadiers 
left the Hankow Barracks Sham-Shui-Po, And 
were transported by ferry from Bamboo pier to 
R.A.A.S.C. Chamber docks Victoria, From where 
they proceeded to the Company areas under 
command of the var ious Company 
Commanders . All Coy's had repor ted to 
Battalion Headquarters as having occupied their 
positions by 1600 hrs. At about 0430 hrs Dec 
8th, Fortress Headquarters advised the Battalion 
Headquarters by telephone that we were at war 
with Japan and that hostilities had commenced. 
At day break Kai-Tak airport was bombed by the 
Japanese and all our planes destroyed on the 
ground. They then turned their attention to 
Sham-Shui-Po camp which was heavily bombed 
but as this place had been evacuated the previous 
day by all troops with the exception of the rear 
party casualties were light. During the day all 
stored and equipment were removed from there 
to the Island by the rear party and this camp 
completely evacuated.... 
Brigade H.Q. and the main north and south 
road across the Island. All positions were 
section posts and ranged form two hundred to 
eight hundred yds apart. The majority of the 
posts were small trench system, High up on 
the steep slopes above the shore line with 
access only from the main highway running 
round the Island in front of their positions, 
Platoon headquarters were situated with one of 
the section posts, Communication being by 
runner with the other posts except in a few 
cases where we rigged up phone 
communications of our own, these were very 
limited owing to the great distance and the 
shortage of wire. A runner would in most cases 
have to traverse exceedingly hilly and difficult 
country to reach the section posts with every 
possibility of losing his way of being shot at 
approaching the position from the front. There 
were very few of the positions which could be 
reached by runner under 15 minutes. Battalion 
Headquarters was situated at Wan-Chai-Gap 
on the line of ridges where a small reserve from 
Headquarters Company were retained with the 
transported and administrative personal. 
Troops of "C" Force march through Kowloon on their way to the 
Sham Shui Po Barracks, Hong Kong, 16 November 1941. 
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or make certain moves and before they could 
be carried out they would be countermanded 
and other and entirely different orders would 
be issued, And on most occasions when 
information was requested the reply would be 
"The situation is very obscure but there does 
not appear to be many Japanese on the Island". 
This we knew to be definitely wrong as from 
contact with the enemy and from observations 
we know there were several thousand opposed 
to us. and at the same time they (Fortress H.Q.) 
seemed very loth to accept any information 
passed on to them and would question the 
source or deny the possibility of it being correct. 
In one instance during the Mount Cameron show 
four enemy Light Cruisers or heavy Destroyers 
were observed cruising in a Westerly direction in 
the Llama Channel within range of the shore 
defence guns. This was reported by telephone 
by Major Trist to Battalion H.Q, who relayed it to 
Fortress H.Q. and the only reply received was 
that it was impossible for any enemy vessels to 
be in that locality and to have it re-checked. At 
the time the reports was made there were two 
other Officers present who verified the position 
and it was later discovered that the same vessels 
had been reported by Major Bailie who was in 
command of the Aberdeen sector, this situation 
continued right up to the end as within two hours 
of the capitulation we received orders for a 
counter attack and Major Trist was in the course 
of organizing all our available men including 
Transport and Administrative staff to carry this 
out at the very time 
that the white flag was 
run up on the flag staff 
at the police station on 
Mount Gough. And I 
have been informed 
that the East Brigade 
were not advised of the 
capi tula t ion unti l 
several hours after it 
was in effect.... 
Lynn Hall, Company 
Headquarters, Winnipeg 
Grenadiers during the 
fighting around the Wong 
Nei Chong Gap. Mount 
Nicholson is in the 
background. 
The evacuation of the mainland defence force took place during the night of 12/13 Dec. 
So that in place of holding out as originally 
planned all defence of the mainland was 
abandoned just five days after the outbreak of 
war (including Devils Peak which was to have 
been held indefinitely at all costs). This led the 
way open for an attack on the Island from the 
mainland across the very narrow channel 
mentioned above, And which was finally effected 
by the Japanese during the night of 18/19 Dec 
after a heavy bombardment of the shore defences 
and under cover of a heavy smoke screen caused 
by some of the oil tanks being set on fire. 
On the withdrawal form the mainland the 
forces on the Island were divided in two. (East 
& West Brigades). West Brigade remaining under 
command of Brigadier Lawson who had in 
addition to the forces already mentioned one of 
the Indian Battalions who were evacuated from 
the mainland who were placed in Victoria for 
the defence of the city, But lost The Royal Rifles 
of Canada and two Companies of the Hong Kong 
Volunteers who were now included in East 
Brigade under Brigadier Wallace. 
During the whole period of the Battle for the 
Island Fortress Headquarters appeared to have 
very little definite information in regard to the 
enemy positions or numbers on the Island. This 
is evidence by the fact that on several occasions 
we received orders to attack certain positions 
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